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Abstract—Protecting programs against control-flow hijacking
attacks recently has become an arms race between defenders
and attackers. While certain defenses, e.g., Control Flow Integrity
(CFI), restrict the targets of indirect control-flow transfers
through static and dynamic analysis, attackers could search the
program for available gadgets that fall into the legitimate target
sets to bypass the defenses. There are several tools helping both
attackers in developing exploits and analysts in strengthening
their defenses. Yet, these tools fail to adequately (1) model the
deployed defenses, (2) compare them in a head-to-head way, and
(3) use program semantic information to help craft the attack
and the countermeasures.
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) has proved to be one of the
promising defenses against control flow hijacks and tons of efforts
have been made to improve CFI in various ways in the past
decade. However, there is a lack of a systematic assessment of the
existing CFI defenses. In this paper, we present RECKON, a static
source code analysis tool for assessing state-of-the-art static CFI
defenses, by first precisely modeling them and then evaluating
them in a unified framework. RECKON helps determine the level
of security offered by different CFI defenses, and find usable
code gadgets even after the CFI defenses were applied, thus
providing an important step towards successful exploits and
stronger defenses. We have used RECKON to assess eight state-
of-the-art static CFI defenses on real-world programs such as
Google’s Chrome and Apache Httpd. RECKON provides precise
measurements of the residual attack surfaces, and accordingly
ranks CFI policies against each other. It also successfully paves
the way to construct code reuse attacks and to eliminate the
remaining attack surface, by disclosing calltargets under one of
the most restrictive CFI defenses.
Index Terms—control-flow integrity, control-flow hijacking,
static source code analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the first Return Oriented Programing (ROP)
attack [61], the cat and mouse game between defenders and
attackers has seen several peaks [58]. As defenses improved
over time, the attacks progressed with them [58]. While
defenders followed several lines of research when building
defenses: control flow integrity [29], [63], [55], [27], [64],
[28], [34], [30], [31], [47], [12], binary re-randomization [50],
information hiding [57], and code pointer integrity [49], the
attacks kept up the pace and got more and more sophisticated
[3], [4], [5], [6], [39].
In principle, even with the myriad of currently available
CFI defenses, performing exploits is still possible. Attackers
could search the program for gadgets that are allowed by CFI
defenses to conduct Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs) [10], [3].
But the attacks become highly program-dependent, and the
applied CFI policies make reasoning about security harder.
The attacker/analyst is thus confronted with the challenge of
searching (manually or automatically) the protected program’s
binary or source code for gadgets which remain useful after
CFI defenses have been deployed. Thus, there is a growing
demand for defense-aware assessing tools, that assist security
analysts to assess CFI defenses.
Existing tools, including static pattern-based gadget search-
ing tools [51], [45] and dynamic attack construction tools
[40], [25], [62], [56], [24], all lack deeper knowledge of the
protected program. As such, they can find CRA gadgets, but
cannot determine if the gadgets are usable after a defense was
deployed. A recent work Newton [40] could assess and bypass
deployed defenses, but it relies on the real execution of the
target program to gather sufficient information.
Consequently, with each applied defense, a more capable
assessment tool needs ideally to: (1) model the defense as
precisely as possible, (2) use program metadata in order not
to solely rely on runtime memory constraints, (3) use precise
semantic knowledge about the protected program code, and
(4) provide absolute measurement numbers w.r.t. the remaining
attack surface. This allows to provide precise and reproducible
measurements, to decide which CFI defense is better suited
for a given situation, and to defend against or craft CRAs by
searching available gadgets.
In this paper, we present RECKON, to our knowledge, the
first static source code analysis framework for modeling and
assessing static state-of-the-art CFI defenses w.r.t. the security
level they offer and the remaining attack surface they have.
It provides a unified framework to evaluate different CFI
defenses, enabling a head-to-head comparison. Note that,
the use of different compilers or platforms would make the
results of CFI evaluation incomparable. RECKON relies on
the insight that, by carefully modeling a CFI defense into a
comprehensive policy, the introduced constraints on call sites
and call targets can be assessed during program compile time,
by a unified compilation analysis component.
RECKON also provides a set of expressive primitives, which
are able to characterize a wide range of static CFI policies. For
example, RECKON provides static primitives related to types,
class hierarchies and virtual table layouts. These primitives
could be used as building blocks to model many CFI policies.
Further, RECKON provides the available/legitimate call targets
under different CFI defenses. It can be reused by CRA attacks,
e.g., the control flow bending attack as described by Carlini et
al. [10], or be used to refine the analysis pipelines of existing
attack construction or defense tools.
Note that, RECKON only focuses on assessing static CFI
defenses, as these are more commonly deployed than dynamic
defenses. In addition, RECKON focuses on source code rather
than on binary code, as comparing various static CFI defenses
against each other is more feasible in this way. Moreover, the
binary CFI policy implementations can be expressed precisely
in source code. Therefore, there is no need to look at the binary
of the protected program since its source code provides more
semantic richness and precision w.r.t. the constraints imposed
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by each CFI defense.
We evaluate RECKON with common open source programs:
NodeJS, Bind, Memcached, Httpd, Lighttpd, Nginx, Apache
Traffic Server, Google’s Chrome Web browser, and Redis. We
show that RECKON can help the assessment of CFI defenses
and is effective at finding gadgets, even with highly restrictive
state-of-the-art CFI defenses deployed. In addition, we demon-
strate how RECKON can be utilized to craft a code reuse attack.
We also show how it can be effectively used to empirically
measure the real attack surface reduction after a certain static
CFI defense policy was used to harden a program’s binary.
Applications of RECKON go beyond CFI defense assessment
framework, and we envision RECKON as a tool for defenders
and software developers to highlight the residual attack surface
of a program.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present a static CFI attack model that is powerful and
drastically lowers the bar for performing CRAs against
state-of-the-art CFI defenses. With this model, we also
introduce a new CFI defense metric (CTR) to more
precisely characterize the existing CFI defenses.
• We implement RECKON, a novel framework usable
for empirically analyzing and comparing CFI defenses
against each other, as well as for generating low-effort
CRAs by identifying the legitimate target sets under
different CFI defenses and highlight how they can be
used to craft attacks.
• We present general evaluation results based on several
real-world programs by comparing existing static CFI
defenses on multiple security relevant dimensions.
Meanwhile, we also present a NodeJS-based case study
with the goal of highlighting how RECKON can be used
to craft CRAs against a state-of-the-art defense, e.g., the
secure VTV/IFCC [34] implementation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CRA Primitives
There are mainly two types of CRA primitives: one exploits
the forward-edge, and the other exploits the backward-edge,
based on the program control flow graph (CFG).
Forward-edge based CRAs exploit the forward-edges of
CFGs. First, at the source code level by performing calls
through either function pointers (e.g., single level of indirec-
tion) or virtual calls (e.g., double level of indirection). For
example, these calls may use an array of function pointers that
is accessed by a pointer to a virtual table (vtable) plus an index.
Second, at the binary level, jump, and call instructions are
used to redirect the program control flow to a different address
than the one intended in the original program CFG.
Backward-edge based CRAs violate CFG backward edges.
First, at the source code level, the function will not return to
the next source code line from where the function was first
called. Second, in the program binary, the address located on
the stack is modified such that the function’s ret instruction
will return to a different address than the one next to the
instruction from where the function was initially called (mostly
through a call instruction).
Finally, these two types of primitives (forward and backward
edges) are used to link gadgets, in order to form a gadget
chain with the goal of performing turing-complete malicious
computations. Note that in this work we focus only on
forward-edge based code reuse attacks and their assessment.
B. Control-Flow Integrity
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a state-of-the-art technique
used successfully along other techniques to protect forward
and backward edges against program control-flow hijacking.
CFI is used to mitigate CRAs by, for example, pre-pending an
indirect callsite with runtime checks that make sure only legal
calltargets are allowed by an as precisely as possible computed
control flow graph (CFG) [1].
Protection Schemes. Alias analysis in binary programs is un-
decidable [9]. For this reason, when protecting CFG forward-
edges, defenders focus on using other program primitives to
enforce a precise CFG during runtime. These primitives are
most commonly represented by the program’s: class hierarchy
[31], virtual table layouts [11], quasi-class hierarchies [27],
binary function types [12] (callsite/calltarget parameter count
matching), etc. They are used to enforce a CFG which is as
close as possible to the original CFG being best described
by the program control flow execution. Note that state-of-the-
art CFI solutions use either static or dynamic information for
determining legal calltargets.
Static Information. CFI solutions that use static information
allow callsites to target: (1) all function entry points e.g., [7],
map callsite types to target function types by creating a mask
which enforces that the number of provided parameters (up to
six) has to be higher than the number of consumed parameters
e.g., [12], (2) a quasi-class hierarchy (no root node(s) and the
edges are not oriented) can be recuperated from the binary and
enforced e.g., [27], (3) all virtual tables that can be recuperated
and enforced e.g., [11], only certain virtual table entries are
allowed e.g., [29] based on a precise function type mapping,
and (4) sub-class hierarchies are enforced e.g., [34], [31], [30].
Dynamic Information. The goal of CFI solutions which
use dynamic information is to refine their runtime analysis
by leveraging program information which is only available
during program execution. In particular, PiCFI [55] restricts
the set of calltargets to functions which have their address
computed during runtime. Context-sensitive solutions with
different levels of context precision rely on hardware features
such as the Last Branch Register (LBR) [60] to track a limited
range (i.e., 16 up to 32 address pairs) of so called from and
to addresses pairs during runtime. They then compare them
against a precomputed program CFG. Finally, note that Intel
Processor Trace (PT) [59] can be used to build a longer history
of address pairs compared to other approaches.
III. DESIGN OF RECKON
A. Overview
RECKON is designed as a static gadget detection framework
which can be used to assist an analyst evaluating the attack sur-
face after different types of static CFI defenses were applied.
To achieve this, RECKON applies a static black box strategy in
2
order to statically retrieve code-reuse gadgets through a set of
attacker-controllable forward control flow graph (CFG) edges.
The forward-vulnerable CFG edges are expressed as a callsite
with a variable number of possible target functions. Further,
these edges can be reused by an attacker to call arbitrary
functions via arbitrary read or write primitives. To call such
series of arbitrary functions, an attacker can chain a number
of edges together by dispatching fake objects contained in a
vector. See, for example, the COOP [3] attack which is based
on a dispatcher gadget used to call other gadgets through a
single loop iteration. The COOP attack uses gadgets which
are represented by whole virtual functions.
RECKON supports a wide range of code reuse defenses based
on user-defined policies, which are composed of constraints
about the set of possible calltargets allowed by a particular
applied CFI defense. The main idea behind RECKON is to
compile the target program with different types of CFI policies
and get the allowed target set per callsite for each constraint
configuration. Note that we assume the program was compiled
with the same compiler as the one on which RECKON is based.
Moreover, RECKON’s policies are reusable and extensible;
they model security invariants of important CRA defenses.
Essentially, under these constraints, virtual pointers at callsites
can be corrupted to call any function in the program. Thus, in
this paper, we focus on the possibility to bend [10] a pointer to
the callsite’s legitimate targets. Further, we assume that large
programs contain enough gadgets for successfully performing
CRAs. Bending assumes that it is possible for an attacker to
reuse protected gadgets during an attack making the applied
defense of questionable benefit.
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Fig. 1: Design of RECKON.
Figure 1 depicts the main components of RECKON and the
workflow used for analyze the source code of a potentially
vulnerable program in order to determine CRA statistics, as
follows. The analyst first provides as input ¶ to RECKON a
program’s source code ·. Based on the previously selected
defense, the desired analysis will be performed. The analysis
previously mentioned is dependent on the selected defense
model and on the available primitives. The analyst does this
if he knows that the defense he wants to apply is currently
available in the RECKON tool. The user selects the used defense
model from the list of implemented defenses. This is done by
switching on a flag inside the RECKON source code, which
can also be implemented as a compiler flag, if desired. In
case the defense is not available, the analyst needs to extend
the list of primitives ¸, and model his defense as a policy
(set of constraints) in the analysis component of RECKON¹. In
order to do this, he needs to know about the analysis internals
of RECKON. After selecting/modeling a defense, the analyst
forwards the application’s source code º to RECKON which
will analyze it with its static analysis component. During static
analysis » the previously selected defense will be applied
when compiling the program source code. As the analysis is
performed, each callsite is constrained with only the legitimate
calltargets. Note that the per callsite, a legitimate calltarget is
dependent on the currently selected defense model. The result
of the analysis contains information about the residual target
set for each individual callsite after a CFI policy was assessed
¼. This list contains a set of gadgets (callsites + calltargets)
that can, given a certain defense model, be used to bend the
control flow of the application. These target constraints are
collected and clustered in the statistics collection component of
RECKON½. Finally, at the end of the gadget collection phase, a
list of calltargets containing potential usable gadgets statistics
Ł based on the currently applied defense(s) will be reported.
B. Reckon’s Analysis Primitives
RECKON provides the following program primitives, which
are either collected or constructed during program compile
time. These primitives are used by RECKON to implement
static CFI policies and to perform calltarget constraint analysis.
Briefly, the currently available primitives are as follows:
Virtual table hierarchy (see [31] for more detailed defi-
nition) allows performing virtual table inheritance analysis of
only virtual classes as only these have virtual tables. Finally,
a class is virtual if it defines or inherits at least one virtual
function.
Vtable set is a set of vtables corresponding to a single
program class. This set is useful to derive the legitimate set
of calltargets for a particular callsite. The set of calltargets is
determined by using the class inheritance relations contained
inside a program.
Class hierarchy (see [43], [44] for a formal definition)
can be represented as a class hierarchy graph with the goal
to model inheritance relations between classes. Note that a
real-world program can have multiple class hierarchies (e.g.,
Chrome, Google’s Web browser). Note that the difference
between virtual table hierarchy and class hierarchy is that the
class hierarchy contains both virtual and non-virtual classes
whereas the virtual table hierarchy can only be used to reason
about the inheritance relations between virtual classes.
Virtual table entries allow RECKON to analyze the number
of entries in each virtual table with the possibility to differen-
tiate between virtual function entries, offsets in vtables, and
thunks.
Vtable type is determined by the name of the vtable root
for a given vtable. A vtable root is the last derived vtable
contained in the vtable hierarchy.
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Callsites are used by RECKON to distinguish between direct
and indirect (object-based dispatch and function-pointer based
indirect transfers) callsites.
Indirect callsites are based on: (1) object dispatches or
(2) function pointer based calls. Based on these primitives,
RECKON can establish different types of relations between call-
sites and calltargets (i.e., virtual functions). At the same time,
we note that it is possible to derive backwards relationships
from calltargets to legitimate callsites based on this primitive.
Callsite function types allow to precisely determine the
number and the type of the provided parameter by a callsite.
As such, a precise mapping between callsites and calltargets
is possible.
Function types allow to precisely determine the number
of parameters, their primitive types and return type value for
a given function. This way, RECKON can generate a precise
mapping between compatible calltargets and callsites.
These primitives can be used as building blocks during the
various analyses that RECKON can perform in order to derive
precise measurements and a thorough assessment of a modeled
static CFI policy. We note that in order to model other CFI
defenses, other (currently not available) simple or aggregated
analysis primitives may need to be added inside RECKON.
C. Constraints
The basic concept of any CRA is to divert the intended
control flow of a program by using arbitrary memory write
and read primitives. As such, the result of such a corruption
is to bend [10] the control flow, such that it no longer
points to the intended (legitimate) calltarget set. This means
that the attacker can point to any memory address in the
program. While this type of attack is still possible, we want to
highlight another type of CRA in which the attacker uses the
intended/legitimate per callsite target set. That is, the attacker
calls inside this set and performs his malicious behavior by
reusing calltargets which are protected, yet usable during an
attack. As previously observed by others [40], CRA defenses
try to mitigate this by mainly relying on one or two dimensions
at a time, as follows:
Write constraints limit the attacker’s capabilities to corrupt
writable memory. If there is no defense in place, the attacker
can essentially corrupt: pointers to data, non-pointer values
such as strings, and pointers to code (i.e., function pointers).
In this paper, we do not investigate these types of defenses
as these were already addressed in detail by Veen et al. [40].
Instead, we focus on target constraints as these represent a
big class of defenses which in our assessment needs separate
and detailed treatment. This obviously does not mean that our
analysis results cannot be used in conjunction with dynamic
write constraint assessing tools. Rather, our results represent
a common ground truth on which runtime assessing tools can
build their gadget detection analysis.
Target constraints restrict the legitimate calltarget set for
a callsite which can be controlled by an attacker. With no
target constraints in place, the target set for each callsite is
represented by all functions located in the program and any
linked shared library. The key idea is to reduce the wiggle
room for the attacker such that he cannot target random call-
sites. As most of these defenses impose a one-to-N mapping,
an attacker being aware of said mapping could corrupt the
pointer at the callsite to bend [10] the control flow to legitimate
targets in an illegitate order to achieve his malicious goals.
This essentially means that all static defenses impose target
constraints.
Static Analysis. RECKON is based on the static analysis
of the program which is represented in LLVM’s intermediate
representation (IR). The analysis is performed during link time
optimization (LTO) inside the LLVM [37] compiler framework
to detect callsites and legitimate callees under the currently
analyzed CFI defense. RECKON uses the currently available
primitives and the implemented defenses to impose target
constraints for each callsite individually. Currently, 8 target
defenses are supported, see §V-B, but this list can easily be
extended since all defenses are based on the similar mecha-
nisms which assessable during a whole program analysis.
Generic Target Constraints. As mentioned above, RECKON
can be used to impose existing generic calltarget constraints
(defenses) based on class hierarchy relations and callsites
and calltarget type matching with different levels of precision
depending on the currently modeled CFI defense. Further,
RECKON allows extending and combining existing policies or
applying them concurrently.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Data Collection and Aggregation
Collection. RECKON collects the virtual tables of a program
in the Clang front-end and pushes them through the compila-
tion pipeline in order to make them available during link-time
optimization (LTO). For each virtual table, RECKON collects
the number of entries. The virtual tables are analyzed and
aggregated to virtual table hierarchies in a later step. Other
data such as direct/indirect callsites and function signatures
are collected during LTO.
Aggregation. Next we present the program primitives which
are constructed by RECKON: (1) virtual table hierarchies based
on the previously collected virtual tables inside the Clang
front-end. The virtual table hierarchies are used to derive
relationships between the classes inside a program (class
hierarchies), determine sub-hierarchy relationships and count,
for example, how many virtual table entries (virtual functions)
a certain virtual table sub-hierarchy has. (2) virtual table
sets which are used for mapping callsites to legitimate class
hierarchy-based virtual calltargets. (3) callsite function types
which are composed of the number of parameters provided by
a callsite, their types, and if the callsite is a void or non-void
callsite. (4) function types which are composed of the function
name, the expected number of parameters and their types and
if the function is a void or non-void function.
B. CFI Defense Modeling
RECKON implements a set of constraints for each modeled
CFI-defense, which are defined as analysis conditions that
model the behavior of each analyzed CFI-defense. These
constraints are particular for each CFI-defense and operate on
different primitives. More specifically, different constraints of
a CFI-defense are implemented inside RECKON. The steps for
modeling a CFI defense are as follows: (1) Which RECKON’s
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primitives are used by the policy? (2) Is there a nesting or
subset relation between primitives? (3) Does the policy rely on
hierarchical meta-data primitives? (4) What is the callsite/call-
target matching criteria? (5) How to count a callsite/calltarget
match?
Note that there is no effort needed to port RECKON from one
policy to another as all policies can operate in parallel during
compile time. As such, the measurement results obtained for
each policy are written in one pass in an external file for later
analysis.
Next, we give a concrete example of how a CFI defense,
TypeArmor’s Bin types policy [12], was modeled inside
RECKON by following the steps mentioned above. For more
details, see Section V-B for a description on how this policy
works and the constraint sub-classes depicted in Section
V-A1. More specifically, for TypeArmor, (1) The policy uses
the: callsite primitive, indirect callsite, callsite function type,
and function type primitives provided by RECKON. (2) From
all functions contained in the program, we analyze only the
virtual functions which expect up to six parameters to be
passed by the callsite. Next from all callsites, we filter out
the ones which are not calling virtual functions and which
provide more than six parameters to the calltarget. Check if the
callsite is a void or non-void callsite. Check if each analyzed
calltarget is a void or non-void target. (3) The policy does
not rely on hierarchical meta-data. (4) A callsite matches a
calltarget if it provides less or the same number of parameters
as the calltarget expects. (5) In case the matching criteria
holds, we count the total count one up for each found match.
Finally, these constraints are implemented as an LLVM
compiler module pass performed during LTO. Note that even
an analyst with restricted previous knowledge can model the
constraints of a CFI policy by observing how other existing
policies were implemented inside RECKON.
C. CFI Defense Analysis
RECKON performs for each implemented CFI defense a
different analysis. Each defense analysis consists of one or
more iterations through the program primitives which are rel-
evant for the CFI defense currently being analyzed. Depending
on the particularities of a defense, RECKON uses different
previously collected program primitives. More specifically,
class hierarchies, class sub-hierarchies, or function signatures
located in the whole program or in certain class sub-hierarchy
are individually analyzed. During a CFI-defense analysis,
statistics are collected w.r.t. the number of allowed calltargets
per callsite taking into account the previously modeled CFI-
defense.
For example, for a certain CFI defense (e.g., TypeArmor’s
CFI policy Bin types) it is required to determine a match
between the number of provided parameters (up to six param-
eters) of each indirect callsite and all virtual functions present
in the program (object inheritance is not taken into account)
which could be the target (may consume up to six parameters)
of such a callsite. In order to analyze this CFI defense and
collect the statistics, RECKON visits all indirect callsites it
previously detected in the program and all virtual functions
located in all previously recuperated class hierarchies. Af-
terwards, each callsite is matched with potential calltargets
(virtual functions). Finally, after all virtual callsites and virtual
functions were visited, the generated information is presented
to the analyst.
D. Implementation Details
We implemented RECKON as one link time optimization
(LTO) pass by extending the Clang/LLVM (v.3.7.0) com-
piler [32] framework infrastructure. The implementation of
RECKON is split between the Clang compiler front-end (part of
the metadata is collected here), and one link-time pass, totaling
around 4.2 KLOC. RECKON supports separate compilation by
relying on the LTO mechanism built in LLVM [32]. By using
Clang, RECKON collects front-end virtual tables and makes
them available during LTO. Next, virtual table hierarchies are
built which are used to model different CFI defenses. Other
RECKON primitives such as function types are constructed
during LTO. Finally, each of the analyzed CFI defense is
separately modeled inside RECKON by using the previously
collected primitives and aggregated data to impose the required
defense constraints.
V. ANALYZING CFI DEFENSES WITH RECKON
In this section, we show how to map real-world CFI
defenses into RECKON based on available primitives. Similarly
to Newton [40], RECKON models the security provided by
CRA defenses along two axes: (1) write constraints imposed
by the defense, and (2) imposed target constraints. The main
motivation for the usage of this modeling technique is that: (1)
the majority of CFI techniques do not impose write constraints,
with the exception of CFI runtime tools which adjust their
analysis by using hardware features, and (2) it serves as a
natural extension (i.e., it eases understanding) of existing work.
Next, we will map the defenses presented in §II according to
these constraints. In our work, we focus only on one class of
defense at a time and we add more constraint types to the target
constraint axis. As opposed to Newton [40], RECKON helps
to derive static constraints imposed on the target program.
This mapping allows to define textual descriptions of each
CFI policy and reduces the task to a compiler-based counting
problem allowing an analyst to determine which callsites and
calltargets are protected and which are not.
A. Deriving Constraints
Defense Write Constraints Target Constraints
Class Subclass Solutions Details Dynamic Details
TypeArmor [12] None 8 Bin types
IFCC/MCFI [47], [34] None 8 Src types
Safe IFCC/MCFI [47], [34] None 8 Safe src Types
ShrinkWrap/IVT [31] None 8 Strict sub-hier.
CFI VTV [34], [30] None 8 Sub-hierarchy
vTint [28] None 8 All vTables
Marx/VCI [27], [64] None 8 vTable hierarchy
HCFI [55] None X Computed
CsCFI [63] Segr X None
vTrust [29] None 8 Strict src types
TABLE I: Mapping of CFI code-reuse defenses into RECKON
constraints. Note that all these CFI defenses were published
in top tier security conferences.
Table I highlights the constraints imposed by each defense
subclass. In our work, we do not consider runtime-based write
5
constraining defenses (HCFI and CsCFI, see Newton [40] for
more details), since these runtime constraints are hard to be
assessed statically. Instead, RECKON models a comprehensive
set of eight defense classes with no write constraints, which
we discuss in detail in the next subsection.
1) Constraint Subclasses: RECKON provides the follow-
ing constraint subclasses. Note that the next three constraint
classes (highlighted in bold italic font) were first presented by
Newton [40], while the last five classes are presented for the
first time in this work.
TypeArmor imposes callsite target constraints based on a
function type policy. In particular, for each callsite only targets
which fulfill the parameter count based policy are allowed
during runtime.
IFCC/MCFI enforces similar constraints as TypeArmor,
with the exception that the function type is computed at the
source rather than at the binary level.
Safe IFCC/MCFI contains the same defenses as the IFC-
C/MCFI defense subclass, except that in this case, we dis-
tinguish a safe mode, where type information is less strict
for compatibility reasons with real-world programs, this is
discussed in the original IFCC paper [34].
VTV subclass enforces for each indirect callsite the whole
subclass hierarchy Src sub-hierarchy which is precise but
leaves wiggle room for the attacker and it enforces too many
calltargets as noted in [31].
ShrinkWrap/IVT subclass can enforce a more precise class
sub-hierarchy (Strict src types) than IFCC/MCFI. For each
indirect callsite (object dispatch) a precise class hierarchy is
computed.
vTint subclass operates at the binary level in order to find
indirect callsites and virtual tables. This subclass is enforcing
for all detected virtual tables (all vtables) all its entries for
each callsite.
Marx/VCI subclass operates on binary to recuperate a quasi
class hierarchy: (1) the class has no root node, and (2) the
edges in the class hierarchy are not oriented.
vTrust subclass enforces matching function types for each
indirect callsite. It follows a precise source code callsite-to-
targets mapping (Strict src types) based on computing at all
calltargets a hash composed of the number, types, and return
type of each virtual function. Next, we use an example to
show how the calltarget sets differ depending on the used CFI
defense.
1 . c l a s s Foo { v i r t u a l vo id g e t ( ) ; } ;
2 . c l a s s Bar : p u b l i c Foo { v i r t u a l vo id g e t ( ) ; }
3 . c l a s s Baz : p u b l i c Bar { v i r t u a l vo id g e t ( ) ; }
4 . c l a s s Bac : p u b l i c Bar { v i r t u a l vo id g e t ( ) ;
5 . v i r t u a l vo id s e t ( ) ; }
6 . Bar ∗b = new Bar ( ) ;
7 . b−>g e t ( ) ;
Listing 1: C++ class hierarchy with four classes.
Listing 1 shows a simple C++ class hierarchy which will
be used to show that based on the used CFI policy different
functions are accessible after applying a certain policy. For
example, under the vTrust CFI policy the indirect call, line
seven in Listing 1 can target any of the four get() functions
located in the Foo, Bar, Baz, and Bac since the function
signatures match since its policy includes function names as
well. For example, vTint allows all four get() functions
and the set() function as targets, as it allows all entries
located in all virtual tables detected in the program. Note
that at the binary level vTint cannot distinguish between
function name as the information vanishes through compila-
tion. Further, under the class hierarchy based analysis (CHA)
of IVT, Bar::get(), Bac::get(), Baz::get() and
Bac::set() can be called, since this policy enforces all
class sub-hierarchies in the protected program.
Shrinkwrap’s CHA policy allows only Bar::get() and
Baz::get() to be called as this policy is aware of primary
and secondary inheritance paths inside the program virtual
table hierarchy. Note that this holds since Baz class is consid-
ered a primary type while the Bac class is a secondary type in
this virtual table hierarchy. Further, both ShrinkWrap and IVT
policies are based on the type of the object. As such, only some
subtypes are allowed. vTrust, for example, relies on the base
objects and is therefore less precise than CHA-based policies.
IVT, for example, allows all subtypes. Note that with a larger
class hierarchy vTrust and IVT policies would allow the same
number of targets are allowed. In contrast, ShrinkWrap allows
just a sub-part of the class sub-hierarchy (some subtypes).
Finally, these CFI policy based target set constrining ex-
amples highlight the fact that the CFI policies have different
granularities w.r.t. constraining the calltarget set per callsite.
B. Describing and Analyzing CFI Defenses
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Fig. 2: Mapping of CFI defense classes to write (X axis) and
target (Y axis) constraints in RECKON.
Figure 2 depicts the constraints of the defenses, presented
in Table I. The constraints are grouped in two categories in
ascending order indicated with two arrows on the X axis
according to their precision of determining precise target sets
per callsite. The X axis shows the write constraints imposed
by each defense subclass, and the Y axis shows the target
constraints. Defenses that share both the same write and target
constraints impose equivalent security restrictions, thus each
(X axis, Y axis) pair depicted in Figure 2 represents an
equivalence class.
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Note that in this paper, we are interested in only static CFI
defenses which do not impose any write constraints. We are
aware that these defenses are thought to be accompanied by
some type of write constraint but for the sake of simplicity,
we abstract these away for now. As such, runtime CFI (black
rectangle), re-randomization (yellow circle), pointer integrity
(brown diamond), and information hiding (green triangle)
depicted in Figure 2 are not taken into consideration as these
were thoroughly analyzed by Newton [40]. Our objective is to
focus on the details of the static CFI class in order to reveal
novel insights of this widely used class of defense. marx:tool
RECKON can compile a given program with DWARF [21]
information. In this situation, the function name and location
inside the program is back-traceable to the exact location in
the source file. The same level of detail is possible for the
associated callsite.
Important to observe is that all static CFI defenses impose
no write constraints and as such it is recommendable to use
these defenses with some type of write constraints which for
example would impose that the virtual pointer used dur[34],
[30]ing object dispatches cannot be overwritten to point to an
illegitimate address inside the program. Further, the value of
this pointer is determined during runtime. We further assume
that there are no implementation specific vulnerabilities of
these defenses and as such the equivalence classes hold. Fur-
ther, our constraint-based classification abstracts away specific
implementation details and ignores implementation specific
differences across these defenses. For example, we consider
the used primitives (e.g., class hierarchy) for enforcing the
CFI policy to be ideal with no precision differences between
binary and source code based tools. As such, we are able
to generate lower bounds w.r.t. the legitimate calltarget set
of these defenses and further, our approach is applicable to
general gadget generation constraints across many different
defenses.
Next, we show how to implement in RECKON the required
constraints for the eight assessed defenses, by using the
primitives specified in Section III-B. Specifically, we present
in detail the constraints imposed at any indirect callsite de-
pending on the target constraint.
Corrupting code pointers. The CFI defenses which do
not impose any write constraints are allowing any memory
to be corrupted, such as code pointers. This is presented in
Figure 2 by abstracting the CFI constraints to a counting
problem of legitimate calltargets per callsite. These defenses
are located on the left hand side of Figure 2 depicted on
the X axis with (None). Note that in general, these type of
constraints assume that the callsite is not corruptible since it
is located in read-only memory, but since these constraints do
not impose any specific code pointer corrupting defense these
are regarded in this paper as not defending code pointer at all.
The particular constraint-based counts are obtained by com-
puting for each constraint the target set counts with our
RECKON tool. Next, RECKON compiles any given program in
order to obtain the target set and performs counts according
to the currently used constraint. Note that while in §V-A1, we
provide the general description of how the constraint classes
work, in this section, we describe how the target constraints
work in detail by associating them to the RECKON primitives.
In the following, we will present eight static CFI defense
classes modeled inside RECKON. These defenses are stemming
from published research papers and are used to constrain
forward edge program control flow transfers to point to only
legitimate calltargets. Note that each CFI defense description
is an idealized and very close to how the original CFI defense
policy which was implemented in each tool. Finally, note that
each modeled defense was previously thoroughly discussed
with the original authors and only after the authors agreed
with these descriptions we modeled them into RECKON. Next
we give the formal definitions of each of the CFI defenses as
these were modeled inside RECKON and the description of the
performed analysis.
Notation. The used notation is as follows: P represents the
analyzed program, Cs is the set of program indirect callsites
(virtual and non-virtual), Csvirt is the set of program virtual
callsites, V is a virtual table hierarchy, Vsub is a virtual table
sub-hierarchy, vt is a virtual table, ve is a virtual table entry
(virtual function), vcs is a virtual callsite, nvf is a non-
virtual function, vf is a virtual function (virtual table entry),
C is a program class hierarchy, Csub is a program class sub-
hierarchy, cs is a indirect callsite (object dispatch or indirect
pointer based function call), ntpcs represents the number and
type of parameters provided by a callsite, ntpct represents the
number and type of parameters provided by a calltarget, F
set of all virtual and non-virtual functions contained in the
program, S is the set of function signatures, M is the policy
matching set of rules. Note that M is determined by all rules
defined by a CFI defense and represents, at the same time,
the matching criteria for each policy. This means that RECKON
increments the count of his analysis by one when such a match
is found.
Bin Types. (TypeArmor) [12] We formalize this policy
ψ as the tuple
〈
Cs, F, V,M
〉
where the relations hold: (1)
V ⊆ F , (2) ve ∈ V , (3) nvf ∈ F , (4) cs ∈ C, and (5)
M ⊆ Cs× V × F .
RECKON’s Analysis. For each indirect callsite cs (1) count
the total number of virtual table entries ve which reside in each
virtual table hierarchy V contained in program P , and also,
(2) count the number of non-virtual functions nvf residing
in F , which need at most as many function parameters as
provided by the callsite and up to six parameters. Further, if
F contains multiple distinct virtual table hierarchies (islands)
then continue to count them too and take them also into
consideration for a particular callsite. An island is a virtual
table hierarchy which has no father child relation to another
virtual table hierarchy contained in the program P .
Safe src types. (Safe IFCC) [34] We formalize this policy
ψ as the tuple
〈
Cs, F, FvirtS,M
〉
where the relations hold:
(1) V ⊆ F , (2) vf ∈ Fvirt, (3) nvf ∈ F , (4) ntpcs ∈ S, (5)
ntpct ∈ S, (6) frt ∈ S, (7) cs ∈ Cs, and (8) M ⊆ Cs×F×S.
RECKON’s Analysis. For each indirect callsite cs count the
number of virtual functions vf and non-virtual functions nvf
located in the program P for which the number and type
of parameters required by the calltarget ntpct matches with
the number and type of parameters provided at the callsite
ntpcs. The function return type frt of the matching function
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is not taken into consideration. All parameter pointer types are
considered interchangeable, e.g., int* and void* pointers are
considered interchangeable.
Src types. (IFCC/MCFI) [47] We formalize this policy
ψ as the tuple
〈
Cs, F, FvirtS,M
〉
where the relations hold:
(1) V ⊆ F , (2) vf ∈ Fvirt, (3) nvf ∈ F , (4) ntpcs ∈ S, (5)
ntpct ∈ S, (6) frt ∈ S, (7) cs ∈ Cs, and (8) M ⊆ Cs×F×S.
RECKON’s Analysis. For each indirect callsite cs count the
number of virtual functions and non-virtual functions located
in the program F for which the number and type of parameters
required at the calltarget ntpct matches the number and type
of arguments provided by the callsite ntpcs. The return type
of the matching function is ignored. Compared to Safe src
types this policy distinguishes between different pointer types,
this means that these are not interchangeable and that the
function signatures are more strict. Neither the return value
of the matching function nor the name of the function are
taken into consideration.
Strict src types. (vTrust) [29] We formalize this policy ψ
as the tuple
〈
Cs, V, F, Fvirt, S,M
〉
where the relations hold:
(1) V ⊆ F , (2) vf ∈ Fvirt, (3) ntfpcs ∈ S, (4) frt ∈ S, (5)
cs ∈ Cs, and (6) M ⊆ Cs× S × Fvirt × V .
Performed Analysis. For each indirect callsite cs compute
the function signature of the function called at this particular
callsite using the number of parameters, their types, and the
name of the function ntfpcs (the literal name used in C/C++
without any class information attached). Match this function
type identifier with each virtual function vf contained in each
virtual table hierarchy V of P . The name of the function is
taken into consideration when building the hash but not the
function return type frt as this can be polymorphic. Note that
we have a match when the signature of a function called by
a callsite matches with the signature of a virtual function vf .
All vtables. (vTint) [28] We formalize this policy ψ as
the tuple
〈
P,Cs, Fvirt, V,M
〉
where the relations hold: (1)
V ⊆ F , (2) ve ∈ V , (3) vf ∈ Fvirt, (4) cs ∈ Cs, and (5)
M ⊆ Cs× V .
RECKON’s Analysis. For each indirect callsite cs count each
virtual function vf corresponding to a virtual table entry ve
contained in each virtual table present in the program P .
vTable hierarchy/island. (Marx) [27] We formalize this
policy ψ as the tuple
〈
P, Fvirt, C, Cs, V,M
〉
where the rela-
tions hold: (1) V ⊆ F , (2) ve ∈ V , (3) vf ∈ Fvirt, (4) vt ∈ V ,
(5) V ∈ C, (6) C ∈ P , (7) cs ∈ Cs, and (8) M ⊆ Cs×V ×C.
RECKON’s Analysis. For each indirect callsite cs count each
virtual function vf corresponding to each virtual table vt entry
ve having the same index in the virtual table as the index
determined at the callsite cs by Marx. Perform this matching
for each virtual table vt where the index matches with the
index determined at the callsite cs and which is located in
the class hierarchy C which contains the class type of the
dispatched object. Note that abstract classes are not taken
in consideration within this policy, this can be recognized
though by virtual tables having pure virtual function entries.
Sub-hierarchy. (VTV) [34] We formalize this policy ψ as
the tuple
〈
P, Fvirt, C, Csub, V,M
〉
where the relations hold:
(1) vt ∈ V , (2) V ⊆ C, (3) C ⊆ P , (4) Csub ∈ C, (5) vf ∈
Fvirt, (6) vcs ∈ P , and (7) M ⊆ Csvirt ×Csub × V × Fvirt.
RECKON’s Analysis. For each virtual callsite vcs build the
class sub-hierarchy Csub having as root node the base class
(least derived class that the dispatched object can be of) of
the dispatched object. From the classes located in the sub-
hierarchy consider, for the currently analyzed callsite, each
virtual table vt. Further within this virtual tables vt’s consider
only the virtual function vf entries located at the offset used by
the virtual object dispatch mechanism. Next count the number
of virtual functions to which these entries point to.
Strict sub-hierarchy. (ShrinkWrap) [31] We formalize
this policy ψ as the tuple
〈
P, Fvirt, C, V, Vsub,M
〉
where the
relations hold: (1) V ⊆ C, (2) ve ∈ V , (3) vf ∈ Fvirt, (4)
vt ∈ V , (5) V ⊆ C, (6) Vsub ⊆ V , (7) C ⊆ P , (8) cs ∈ P ,
and (9) M ⊆ CsvirtV × Vsub × Fvirt.
RECKON’s Analysis. For each virtual callsite vcs identify
the virtual table vt type used. Take this virtual table vt from
the base class C of the dispatched object and build the virtual
table vt sub-hierarchy Vsub having this virtual table vt as root
node. From the virtual tables in this vt sub-hierarchy find the
virtual function vf entries located at the offset used by the
virtual object dispatch mechanism for this particular callsite
cs. Next count each virtual function vf , to which these virtual
table entries ve point to. Finally, after RECKON computes for
each callsite the total calltarget set count, as above described
for each policy, it sums up all results for each callsite to
generate several statistics.
VI. EVALUATION
In this Section, we show RECKON usefulness by addressing
the following research questions (RQs): RQ1: What is the
residual attack surface of NodeJS (we performed an use
case) after eight state-of-the-art CFI policies are independently
applied (§VI-A)? RQ2: What score would each of the an-
alyzed CFI defenses get (§VI-B)? RQ3: How can RECKON
be used to rank CFI policies based on the offered protection
level (§VI-C)? RQ4: What is the residual attack surface for
several real-world analyzed programs (§VI-D)? RQ5: How can
RECKON be used to construct code reuse attacks? (§VI-E)?
Test Programs. In our evaluation, we used the fol-
lowing real-world programs: Nginx [17] (Web server, us-
able also as: reverse proxy, load balancer, mail proxy
and HTTP cache, v.1.13.7, C code), NodeJS [15] (cross-
platform JavaScript run-time environment, v.8.9.1, C/C++
code), Lighttpd [16] (Web server optimized for speed-critical
environments, v.1.4.48, C code), Httpd [18] (cross-platform
Web server, v.2.4.29, C code), Redis [19] (in-memory database
with in-memory key-value store, v.4.0.2, C code), Memcached
[20] (general-purpose distributed memory caching system,
v.1.5.3, C/C++ code), Apache Traffic Server [22] (modular,
high-performance reverse proxy and forward proxy server,
v.2.4.29, C/C++ code), and Chrome [23] (Google’s Web
browser, v.33.01750.112, C/C++ code).
Experimental Setup. The experiments were performed on
an Intel i5-3470 CPU with 8GB of RAM running on the Linux
Mint 18.3 OS. All experiments were performed ten times to
provide reliable values. If not otherwise stated, we modeled
each of the eight CFI defenses inside RECKON according to
the policy descriptions provided in Section V.
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Targets Median Targets Distribution
P NodeJs MKSnapshot
NodeJS MKSnaphot Total Min Max Min 90p Max Min 90p Max
(1) 21,950 (21,950) 15,817 (15,817) 15,817 (20,253) 15,817 (15,817) 21,950 (21,950) 12,545 (885) 30,179 (30,179) 32,478 (32,478) 8,714 (244) 21,785 (21,785) 23,376 (23,376)
(2) 2,885 (88) 2,273 (495) 2,273 (139) 2,273 (88) 2,885 (21,950) 0 (0) 5,751 (5,751) 5,751 (5,751) 1 (0) 4,436 (4,436) 4,436 (4,436)
(3) 1,511 (56) 1,232 (355) 1,232 (139) 1,232 (56) 1,511 (355) 0 (0) 5,751 (5,751) 5,751 (5,751) 1 (0) 4,436 (4,436) 4,436 (4,436)
(4) 3 2 3 2 3 0 499 730 0 507 756
(5) 6,128 2,903 6,128 2,903 6,128 6,128 6,128 6,128 2,903 2,903 2,903
(6) 2 1 2 1 2 0 54 243 0 16 108
(7) 2 1 1 1 2 0 7 243 0 11 108
(8) 2 1 1 1 2 0 6 243 0 9 108
TABLE II: Legitimate calltargets per callsite for each of the eight CFI policies for NodeJS after each CFI defense was
individually applied. The values not contained in round brackets are obtained for only virtual callsites and all targets (i.e.,
virtual and non-virtual), while the values in round brackets are obtained for all indirect callsites (i.e., virtual and function
pointer based calls) and all targets. For the Bin types, Safe src types, and Src types policies depicted above the targets can be
virtual or non-virtual, for the remaining policies the targets inherently can only be virtual functions. Targets median: (minimum
and maximum) number of legal function targets per callsite. Target distribution: minimum/90th percentile/maximum number of
targets per callsite. This 90p is determined by sorting the values in ascending order, and picking the value at 90%. This means
that 90% of the sorted values have a lower or equal value to 90p. P: Policy (Static target constraints), (1) Bin types [12], (2)
Safe src types [34], (3) Src types [47], (4) Strict src types [29], (5) All virtual tables [28], (6) virtual Table hierarchy [27], (7)
Sub-hierarchy [30], and (8) Strict sub-hierarchy [31].
Callsites Targets Baseline Virtual Function Targets
P Value Write cons. Base. all func. Base. vFunc. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Min 12,545 (1,956) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6,128 0 0 0
90p 30,179 (4,078) 5,751 (810) 5,751 (810) 499 (10) 6,128 54 7 6
NJS Max none 32,478 6,300 32,478 (4,455) 5,751 (810) 5,751 (810) 730 (243) 6,128 243 243 243
Median 21,950 (3,106) 2,885 (426) 1,511 (121) 3 (3) 6,128 2 2 2
Avg 19,395 (2,793) 2,406 (414) 2,113 (354) 86 (12) 6,128 14 8 8
Min 2,608 (232) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 788 0 0 0
90p 4,085 (546) 1,315 (97) 1,315 (97) 17 (13) 788 34 7 7
TS Max none 6,201 796 6,201 (710) 1,315 (159) 1,315 (159) 18 (16) 788 42 18 18
Median 2,608 (232) 1,315 (97) 1,315 (97) 17 (13) 788 7 1 1
Avg 3,122 (321) 928 (76) 923 (74) 11 (9) 788 10 3 3
Min 97,041 (37,873) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 68,560 0 0 0
90p 201,477 (63,816) 64,315 (24,661) 64,315 (24,661) 48 (30) 68,560 192 25 15
C Max none 232,593 78,992 232,593 (71,000) 64,315 (24,661) 64,315 (24,661) 3,029 (509) 68,560 4,486 4,486 4,486
Median 97,041 (37,873) 8,672 (4,593) 7,633 (4,593) 3 (2) 68,560 6 2 2
Avg 128,452 (45,731) 29,315 (11,119) 29,127 (11,013) 57 (19) 68,560 78 37 32
TABLE III: Legitmate calltargets per callsite for only virtual callsites and for only the C++ programs after each CFI defense
was individually applied. Baseline all func. represents the total number of functions, while Baseline virtual func. represents
the number of virtual functions. The first four policies, from left to right in italic font (Bin types, Safe src types, Src types, and
Strict src types) allow virtual or non-virtual targets, while the remaining four policies inherently allow only virtual targets. This
is not a limitation of RECKON but rather how these were intended, designed and used in the original tools from where these are
stemming. The values in round brackets show the theoretical results after adapting the first four policies to only allow virtual
targets. Each table entry contains five aggregate values: minimal, 90p: minimum/90th percentile/maximum, maximal, median
and average (Avg) number of targets per callsite. P: program, NJS: NodeJS, TS: Traffic Server, C: Chrome. (1) Bin types, (2)
Safe src types, (3) Src types, (4) Strict src types, (5) All virtual tables, (6) virtual Table hierarchy, (7) Sub-hierarchy, and (8)
Strict sub-hierarchy.
P B Bin types Safe src types Src types Strict src types All vTables vTable hierarchy Sub-hierarchy Strict sub-hierarchy
Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p
NJS 6,300 59.72 21.0 92.92 7.41 6.32 17.71 6.51 6.44 17.71 0.26 0.54 1.54 97.27 0.0 97.27 0.23 0.63 0.86 0.13 0.46 0.11 0.13 0.46 0.1
TS 796 50.35 15.79 65.88 14.97 8.89 21.21 14.89 9.01 21.21 0.18 0.12 0.27 98.99 0.0 98.99 1.26 1.27 4.27 0.34 0.51 0.88 0.34 0.51 0.88
C 78,992 55.23 19.08 86.62 12.6 12.16 27.65 12.52 12.22 27.65 0.02 0.11 0.02 86.79 0.0 86.79 0.1 0.43 0.24 0.05 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.41 0.02
Avg. 28,696 55.1 18.62 81.8 11.66 9.12 22.19 11.3 9.22 22.19 0.15 0.25 0.61 94.35 0.0 94.35 0.53 0.77 1.79 0.17 0.46 0.34 0.17 0.46 0.33
TABLE IV: Normalized results with the Baseline using only virtual callsites. Note that virtual callsites all eight policies can
be used as these were designed in the original papers to be used for these types of callsites as well. Baseline: Total number
of possible virtual targets. Each entry contains three aggregate values: average-, standard deviation (SD) and 90p-number of
targets per callsite. The lower the Average value is the better the CFI defense is. B: baseline, P: program, NJS: NodeJS, TS:
Traffic Server, C: Chrome
Reckon’s Metric. Let icsi be a particular indirect callsite in
a program P , ctri is the total number of legitimate calltargets
for an icsi after hardening a program with a certain CFI policy.
Then the CTR metric is: CTR =
∑n
i=1 ctri. Note that the
lower the value of CTR is for a given program, the more
precise the CFI policy is. We used this metric to compute the
residual attack surface after a CFI defense was applied.
A. Detailed Analysis of NodeJS
In this Section, we analyze the residual attack surface after
each of the eight CFI policies was applied individually to
NodeJS. Note that three out of the eight assessed CFI policies
used in the following Tables are the same as used by Veen et al.
[40] (we share the same names). For the other five CFI policies
we use names which reflect their particularities. We selected
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NodeJS as this is a very popular real-world application and it
contains both C and C++ code. As such, RECKON can collect
results for the C and C++ related CFI polices.
Table II depicts the static target constraints for the NodeJS
program under different static CFI calltarget constraining
policies. Table II provides the minimal and maximum values
of virtual calltargets which are available for a virtual callsite
after one of the eight CFI policies is applied. MKSnapShot
contains the Chrome V8 engine and is used as a shared library
by NodeJS after compilation. We decided to add MKSnapshot
in Table II as this component is strongly used by NodeJS and
represents a source of potential calltargets. The NodeJS results
were obtained after static linking of MKSnaphot.
The targets median entries in Table II (left hand side) in-
dicate the median values obtained for independently applying
one of the eight CFI policies to NodeJS. For both NodeJS
and MKSnaphot, the best median number of residual targets
is obtained using the following policies: (1) vTable hierarchy,
(2) Sub-hierarchy, and (3) Strict sub-hierarchy. These results
indicate that these three CFI policies provide the lowest attack
surface while the highest attack surface is obtained for the Bin
types policy, which allows the highest number of virtual and
non-virtual targets.
The targets distribution in Table II (right hand side) shows
the minimum, maximum and 90 percentile results for the
same eight policies as before. While the minimum value is
0 the highest values for both NodeJS and MKSnapshot are
obtained for the Bin types policy, while the lowest values
are obtained for the following policies: (1) vTable hierarchy,
(2) Sub-hierarchy, and (3) Strict sub-hierarchy. Further, the
90p results show that on the tail end of the distribution, a
noticeable difference between the three previously mentioned
policies exists. We can observe that for these critical callsites
the Strict sub-hierarchy policy provide the least amount of
residual targets and therefore the best protection against CRAs.
Meanwhile, the 90p results for the Strict src type and vTable
hiearchy policies indicate that the residual attack surface might
still be sufficiently large for the attacker.
B. CFI Defenses Scores
Figure 3 depicts the scores obtained by each of the eight
policies which were analyzed for the Chrome Web browser.
We opted to depict the values for only the Chrome browser
since this represents the largest (approx. 10 Mil. LOC) ana-
lyzed program. The numbers on the gray shaded bars represent
the 90p values while the values on the black shaded bars rep-
resent the average values for the Chrome Web browser. These
values can be observed in Table III on the last row from top to
bottom for the Chrome browser as well. The optimal score is
one and means that each callsite is allowed to target a single
calltarget. This is the case only during runtime. The lower the
bar is or the closer the value is to one the better the score is.
The best score w.r.t. the 90p and average values is obtained
for the Strict sub-hiearchy which is the best CFI defense from
the eight analyzed policies. Interestingly to note that the best
function signature based policy Stric src types has a slightly
worse score than the second based class based CFI defense
(Sub-hierarchy). Finally, we note that these CFI-based forward
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Fig. 3: Scores obtained by each analyzed CFI defense. The
scores are depicted in logarithmic scale in order to better
compare the values against each other. The optimal score has
the value of one depicted on the left had side Y axis.
edge policies are not optimal (provide values larger than one)
and the desired goal is to have such policies which provide a
one-to-one mapping as shadow stack based techniques.
C. Ranking of CFI Policies
In this Section, we normalize the results presented in RQ2
using the Baseline values, (i.e., the number of possible target
functions), in order to be able to compare the assessed CFI
policies against each other w.r.t. calltarget reduction. This
allows to compare the analyzed CFI defenses on programs
with different sizes and complexities which would be not
possible otherwise.
Table IV depicts the average, standard deviation and 90th
percentile results obtained after analyzing only virtual callsites.
Unless stated otherwise, we use the CTR metric introduced
at the beginning of this section. For these callsites, all eight
CFI policies can be assessed.
We calculated the average over the three C++ programs
after normalization. By considering these aggregate average
values, the eight policies can be ranked (from best (smallest
aggregate average) to worst (highest aggregate average)) as
follows: (1) Strict src types (0.15), (2) Strict sub-hierarchy
(0.17), (3) Sub-hierarchy (0.17), (4) vTable hierarchy (0.53),
(5) Src types (11.3), (6) Safe src types (11.66), (7) Bin types
(55.1), and (8) All vTables (94.35).
From the class hierarchy-based policies Strict sub-hierarchy
perform best in all three aggregate results (Avg, SD and 90p).
In comparison, Strict sub-hierarchy performs better w.r.t. aver-
age and standard deviation but worse w.r.t. 90p. These results
indicate that these two policies are the most restrictive, but a
clear winner in all evaluated criteria cannot be determined.
Table V depicts (similarly to Table IV) normalized results
with the difference that all indirect callsites (both virtual and
pointer based) are analyzed. Thus, the Baseline values used
for normalization include virtual and non-virtual targets. By
taking into account the aggregate averages and the standard
deviation of the three policies in Table V, we can rank the
policies as follows (from best to worse): (1) Src types (Avg
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Bin types Safe src types Src types
P B Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p Avg SD 90p
a 32,478 64.0 20.43 92.92 3.82 5.83 17.71 3.38 5.64 17.71
b 6,201 54.03 18.76 87.89 13.54 9.27 21.21 13.46 9.36 21.21
c 232,593 56.83 19.84 86.62 11.71 12.11 27.65 11.64 12.16 27.65
d 1,949 52.18 26.5 92.0 2.7 3.01 8.21 2.46 3.01 8.21
e 594 65.25 27.81 97.98 2.94 3.18 7.41 2.93 3.19 7.41
f 225 69.75 7.11 68.89 1.0 0.97 0.89 1.0 0.97 0.89
g 1,270 54.91 24.85 92.28 6.38 4.56 11.73 6.36 4.57 11.73
h 2,880 65.19 16.51 84.62 1.25 2.52 1.88 1.2 2.52 1.88
Avg 34,773 60.3 34.39 87.9 5.4 5.18 12.09 5.3 5.17 12.08
TABLE V: Normalized results using all indirect callsites.
B:baseline, a:NodeJS, b:Apache Traffic Server, c:Google’s
Chrome, d:Httpd, e:LightHttpd, f:Memcached, g:Nginx,
h:Redis.
5.3 and SD 5.17), (2) Safe src types (Avg 5.4 and SD 5.18),
and (3) Bin types (Avg 60.3 and SD 34.39).
By considering the 90p values we conclude that for the
most vulnerable 10% of callsites, Bin types only restricts
the target set to 87.9% of the unprotected target set. These
callsites essentially remain unprotected. Meanwhile, the Safe
src type and Src type policies restrict to only around 12% of
the unprotected target set.
D. Generalized Results
Table VI provides results for the three policies which can
provide protection for both C and C++ programs. In contrast
to Table III, all indirect calls are taken into account (including
virtual calls). Therefore, the targets can be virtual or non-
virtual. Intuitively, the residual attack surface grows with the
size of the program. This can be observed by comparing the
results for large (e.g., Chrome) with smaller (e.g., Memcached)
programs.
Table III depicts the overall results obtained after applying
the eight assessed CFI policies to virtual callsites only. The
first four policies (italic font) cannot differentiate between
virtual and non-virtual calltargets. Therefore, for these policies
the baseline of possible calltargets includes all functions (both
virtual and non-virtual). This is denoted with Baseline all
func. Since the remaining four policies can only be applied
to virtual callsites, they restrict the possible calltargets to only
virtual functions. Thus, the baseline for these policies includes
only virtual functions (Baseline virtual function). For a better
comparison between the first and second categories of policies,
we also calculated the target set when restricting the first
four policies to only allow virtual callsites. For Bin types,
Safe src types, Src types, and All vTables the results indicate
that there is no protection offered. The three-class hierarchy-
based policies perform best when considering the median and
average results. In addition, the Strict src type policy performs
surprisingly well, especially after restricting the target set to
only virtual functions. Med: median.
E. Towards Automated CRAs Construction
In this Section, we show how RECKON is used to build
an attack which bypasses a state-of-the-art CFI policy-based
defense, namely VTV’s Sub-hierarchy Policy. This case study
is architecture independent, since RECKON’s analysis is per-
formed at the IR level during LTO time in LLVM. Note
that LLVM IR code represents a higher level representation
of machine code (metadata), thus our results can be applied
Targets (Non-)vFunctions
P Value Callsite
write
cons.
Baseline
all func.
(1) (2) (3)
Min 885 0 0
90p 30,179 5,751 5,751
a Max none 32,478 32,478 5,751 5,751
Med 21,950 88 56
Avg 20,787 1,242 1,099
Min 357 0 0
90p 5,450 1,315 1,315
b Max none 6,201 6,201 1,315 1,315
Med 2,608 1,315 1,315
Avg 3,350 840 835
Min 3,612 0 0
90p 201,477 64,315 64,315
c Max none 232,593 232,593 64,315 64,315
Med 97,041 8,672 7,394
Avg 132,182 27,238 27,074
Min 99 0 0
90p 1,793 160 160
d Max none 1,949 1,915 160 160
Med 1,070 18 16
Avg 1,017 53 48
Min 37 0 0
90p 582 44 44
e Max none 594 582 44 44
Med 395 6 6
Avg 388 17 17
Min 92 0 0
90p 155 2 2
f Max none 225 221 17 17
Med 155 2 2
Avg 157 2 2
Min 422 1 1
90p 1,172 149 149
g Max none 1,270 1,259 149 149
Med 719 75 75
Avg 697 81 81
Min 1,266 1 1
90p 2,437 54 54
h Max none 2,880 2,635 391 391
Med 1,994 16 14
Avg 1,877 36 35
TABLE VI: Results for virtual and pointer based callsites.
P: program, Memchd: Memcached, (1) Bin types, (2) Safe
src types, (3) Src types. a:NodeJS, b:Apache Traffic Server,
c:Google’s Chrome, d:Httpd, e:LightHttpd, f:Memcached,
g:Nginx, h:Redis.
to other architectures (e.g., ARM) as well. Our case study
assumes an ideal implementation of VTV/IFCC. Breaking the
ideal instrumentation shows that the defense can be bypassed
in any implementation.
In this case study, we present the required components for
a COOP attack by studying the original COOP attack against
Mozilla’s Firefox web browser and demonstrate that such an
attack is easier to perform when using RECKON. Thus, we
discuss the importance of the CRA construction with RECKON
at hand.
The original COOP attack presented by Schuster et al. [3]
used: (1) a buffer overflow filled with six fake counterfeit
objects by the attacker, (2) precise knowledge of the Firefox
libxul.so layout, (3) where an COOP dispatcher gadget
(ML-G) resides, and (4) several other useful gadgets in order
to open an Unix shell.
In general terms, to pursue a CRA the attacker needs: (1) an
exploitable memory corruption, (2) attack starting point (i.e.,
callsite) becomes corruptible due to (1), (3) program binary
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memory layout leak, (4) appropriate (usable and available)
gadgets, (5) the possibility to read and write into memory,
(6) the possibility to link gadgets and pass information from
one to each other, and (7) the possibility to perform calls into
the system stdlib or any other reach functionality library.
As demonstrated, the attacker first has to find an exploitable
memory corruption (e.g., buffer overflow, etc.) and fill it with
fake objects. Next, the attacker calls different gadgets (virtual
functions) located in the program binary. As such, we assume
that NodeJS contains an exploitable memory vulnerability (i.e.,
buffer overflow), and that the attacker is aware of the layout of
the program binary. The attacker would then want to bend the
control flow to only per callsite legitimate calltargets since
he does not know if other defenses are in place. He would
also want to avoid calling into other program class hierarchies.
Therefore, he needs to know which calltargets are legitimate
for all callsites in the main NodeJS binary.
CS Target Policies
# Baseline
only
vFunc.
Baseline
all
Func.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a 5 6,300 32,478 31,305 4 4 1 6,128 1 1 1
b 2 6,300 32,478 21,950 719 719 49 6,128 57 53 49
c 3 6,300 32,478 27,823 136 136 1 6,128 1 1 1
d 1 6,300 32,478 12,545 810 810 1 6,128 72 12 12
e 1 6,300 32,478 1,956 810 810 1 6,128 72 13 13
f 1 6,300 32,478 1,956 810 810 6 6,128 20 19 19
g 3 6,300 32,478 1,956 810 810 6 6,128 20 19 19
h 2 6,300 32,478 3,106 35 35 8 6,128 48 13 5
i 2 6,300 32,478 3,106 2,984 2,984 49 6,128 53 53 49
j 2 6,300 32,478 3,106 719 719 49 6,128 53 53 19
TABLE VII: Ten controllable callsites and their legitimate
targets under the Sub-hierarchy CFI defense. #: passed param-
eters. CS: Ten controllable callsites, (1) Bin types, (2) Safe src
types, (3) Src types, (4) Strict src types, (5) All virtual tables,
(6) virtual Table hierarchy, (7) Sub-hierarchy, and (8) Strict
sub-hierarchy.
Table VII depicts ten controllable callsites (in total RECKON
found thousands of controllable callsies) for which the
legitimate target set, depending on the used CFI policy,
ranges from one to 31,305 calltargets. a:debugger.cpp:13
29:33, b:protocol.cpp:839:60, c:schema.cpp:133:33,
d:handle wrap.cc:127:3, e:cares wrap.cc:642:5,
f:node platform.cc:25:5, g:node http2 core.h:417:5,
h:tls wrap.cc:771:10, i:protocol.cpp:839:60, and
j:protocol.cpp:836:60.
For each calltarget, RECKON provides: file name, function
name, start address and source code line number such that it
can be easily traced back in the source code file. The calltargets
(right hand side in Table VII in italic font) represent available
calltargets for each of the eight assessed policies.
For our case study, we decided not to use the most restrictive
CFI policy (i.e., Strict sub-hierarchy) as it enforces the same
function in the virtual table sub-hierarchy. As such, only
through inheritance, chances are that the implementation of
the function may vary from the initial implementation. Thus,
the number of useful gadgets would be low.
Consequently, we assume that the attacker knows that the
NodeJS binary is protected with the Sub-hierarchy policy.
The attacker ranks all callsites depending on the number of
usable calltargets. By ranking the callsites w.r.t. their residual
target set, the attacker wants to know the precise functions
(calltargets) which are allowed for each callsite. Further, in
order to perform the attack, he has to access the source code
of the application. After searching through the source code,
he finds several callsites where vector-based object dispatches
are performed. The attacker next finds out that the detected
calltarget set contains several usable gadgets. Note that for
the COOP attack to be performable, the only hard constraint
is that at least one usable ML-G gadget must exist in the
program. This constraint was addressed by the attacker at the
beginning of their source code search since they decided to
only look for callsites which are part of an ML-G COOP
gadget. As such, the attacker knows exactly which gadgets are
available for each controllable callsite. As none of the static
CFI policies impose write constraints by default (i.e., none) the
attacker can overflow a buffer at a certain callsite with fake
objects. Further, they start to call their gadgets one by one and
passing information over the stack through scratch registers
from one gadget to the next one. Note that their attack does not
violate the CFI check in place at the selected object dispatch
location since this is contained in a ML-G gadget. Further, he
can deliberately avoid violating the original program control
flow by calling into other program class hierarchies or other
illegitimate calltargets as the original COOP attack does.
Eventually, the attacker succeeds in opening an Unix shell.
Finally, this shows the usefulness of RECKON for an analyst,
when searching for legitimate gadgets that available for each
callsite after a certain CFI policy was applied. Thus, this helps
to better tailor his attack w.r.t. the deployed CFI-based defense.
VII. DISCUSSION
RECKON’s Metrics vs. other CFI Metrics. Existing CFI-
defense assessing metrics (e.g., AIR, fAIR and AIA) are
designed to reason about CFI based defenses by providing
average values obtained mostly by dividing the total number
of control flow transfers to the total number of callistes for
example. Also, when computing these values the ground truth
numbers w.r.t. available calltargets, total number of calltargets,
total number of unprotected calltargets are in most cases not
provided. Thus, it is hard for any researcher which looks for
reproducibility of these results to compare his results with
other research results. Further, these metrics do not reason
about other aspects of CFI-based defenses such as the forward
check runtime overhead, return site target reduction, return site
target runtime overhead and availability of gadgets at the end
of the forward or backward edges. Thus the only benefit of
these metrics are some average numbers which are hard to
reproduce because of the above mentioned reasons. Finally,
similar to RECKON these three metrics do not reason about
gadget link-ability which would help to shed light in areas
of optimal CFI-based protection schemes which then could
be effectively used to protect applications without the need
to enforce a strict CFI-policy on the whole program binary
or libraries. More specifically, think as if the defender could
harden a C++ based application such that all main loop gadgets
(and alike) are made unusable for any attacker. This would
remove a crucial building block for a COOP attack and thus
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the attacker would not have an important building block in his
arsenal. Thus, the COOP attack would not be possible.
RECKON’s metrics are superior compared to AIR, fAIR and
AIA metrics since these allow to quantify static CFI-based
defenses w.r.t. to more dimensions. Further, RECKON allows
to precisely reason about the forward edge based calltarget
reduction by allowing to better compare the obtained results
with ground truth numbers, by for example not averaging
the results and providing the first framework which allows to
comprehensively reason about a CFI defense. Finally, RECKON
can be used to reason quantitatively and consistently about
object-oriented programing (OOP) concepts which represent
the building blocks for many CFI defenses.
VIII. LIMITATIONS
Evaluation Results. We are aware that our evaluation results
reflect the measurements obtained by applying RECKON on
several real-world open source programs which may not
generalizable. We therefore believe that more programs should
be evaluated with the help of RECKON (the first CFI-based
consistently reasoning framework for static CFI defenses).
Thus, we urge other researchers to use RECKON’s CFI-based
metrics when assessing their defense and comparing it with
other existing tools. Finally, we envisage that RECKON could
become the de-facto-standard benchmarking framework for
assessing static CFI-based defenses.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have presented RECKON, a CFI defense assessment
and gadget search framework which allows for the first time
to thoroughly compare CFI defenses against each other. We
implemented RECKON, on top of the Clang/LLVM compiler
framework which offers the possibility to precisely analyze
real-world programs. By using RECKON, an analyst can
drastically cut down the time needed to search for gadgets
which are compatible with state-of-the-art CFI defenses
contained in many real-world programs. Our experiment
results indicate that most of the CFI defenses are too
permissive. Further, if an attacker does not only rely on the
program binary when searching for gadgets and has a tool such
as RECKON at hand to analyze the source code of the vulnerable
application, then many CFI defenses can be easily bypassed.
Finally, in order to support further research we plan to release
RECKON’s source code as open source upon paper acceptance.
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